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Abstract 
 
Purpose: We examine the impact of corporate governance on risk and forward-looking disclosures in Qatar.  
 
Design: We automatically measure levels of risk and forward-looking disclosures in the annual reports of 
Qatari firms for the period 2008-2014. We also use two ways clustered error pooled panel regressions to 
examine the determinants of these disclosures.  
 
Findings: We find that firms with a higher percentage of foreign ownership disclose more forward-looking 
information; conversely, board size has a negative impact on the forward-looking disclosure. Financial firms 
tend to disclose less forward-looking information, however, they tend to disclose more forward-looking 
information after the 2008 global financial crisis. We also find negative relationships between the risk 
disclosure and both the number of non-executive members of the board of directors and duality role of the CEO.  
 
Research implications: Our findings should help the users of corporate annual reports in Qatar to understand 
managerial incentives for reporting risk and forward-looking information. This should help regulators to set a 
proper set of disclosure rules. Moreover, this study increases our understanding of the behavior of international 
investors and the board characteristics (i.e. board size) in motivating risk and forward-looking disclosures in 
Qatari firms.  
 
Originality: We provide the original empirical evidence on the impact of corporate ownership and board 
characteristics on risk and forward-looking disclosures for Qatari firms using two ways clustered error pooled 
panel regressions.  
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1. Introduction  
We investigate the impact of corporate governance on risk and forward-looking disclosures in Qatar. 
Although there is a considerable research on the impact of governance on risk and forward-looking disclosures 
in the UK and the US, little research has been done in developing countries. Developing markets are different 
from the UK and the US markets from many aspects including the market size, number of investors, number 
of listed firms, corporate governance codes, ownership structure in firms and different developmental stage. 
We, therefore, expect that determinants of voluntary disclosures for the developing countries might not be the 
same as the developed countries. This motivates us to test if governance mechanisms affect risk and forward-
looking disclosures in a developing country.   
Literature shows that risk disclosure vary across the GCC countries despite sociocultural and 
regulatory similarities (Abdallah et al., 2015) and Qatari firms report more forward-looking information 
compared to firms in other GCC firms (Mohamed & Basuony (2014)). This motivates us to examine 
disclosure practice in Qatar. The integration of the Qatari market with the global economic system increases 
the need for more non-financial information (i.e. risk and forward-looking information).  Therefore, we 
measure the levels of this type of information and its determinants in Qatar.   
Qatar is one of the wealthiest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita US$ 94,744. The GDP 
Growth Rate in Qatar averaged 3.56 percent from 2004 until 2015. Qatar's economy is highly dependent oil 
and gas extraction, it is the second largest gas reserves in the world representing more than 5% of the world 
total (Qatar Statistics Authority, World Bank). In addition, the Qatari banking system is the third largest 
banking system in the GCC region although it is one of the smallest countries in term of population and 
geographical area (Hossain et al., 2012). The rapid economic growth in Qatar creates a need to develop the 
investor protection environment by improving financial regulation for financial reporting. In addition, the new 
governance code issued in February 2009 by the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) offers an 
opportunity to study the impact of governance on risk and forward looking disclosures. This requires a 
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development for investor protection through enhancing the governance environment which is part of the 
strategic plan for this country (2030). Finally, the Qatari stock market is important as one of the attractive 
destination for foreign investments for being one of the major gas exporter and the huge expanding in the 
economy since 2009. This economic growth attracts foreign investors who demand more risk and forward-
looking disclosures.  
We offer new evidence on the impact of corporate governance on risk and forward-looking disclosures 
in Qatar. Prior research shows that an optimal system of governance for all firms and all countries is 
nonexistent (Castrillo et al., 2010), therefore ‘‘one size does not fit all” (Abdallah and Ismail, 2017) and 
corporate governance influence on voluntary disclosure can be different from market to another. This creates a 
need for more research on the impact of governance on voluntary disclosure. Prior research on the 
determinants of risk and forward-looking disclosures use limited governance mechanisms (see Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2011; Elshandidy et al, 2013 and Al-Maghzom, et al., 2016). In our paper, we hand-collect a 
comprehensive set of governance variables for all listed firms in Qatar stock exchange. This should inform 
policy makers about which governance mechanism motivates Qatari companies to disclose risk and forward-
looking information in their annual reports. This is important because “the full adoption of governance 
practices and transparency measures still faces challenges as a result of the conservative and protectionist 
investment culture in Qatar which is manifested by weak disclosure of information, and unwillingness to 
relinquish ownership and control by large block-holders” (Abdallah and Ismail, 2016) .  
We also offer a methodological contribution. We use Nvivo 11 software to calculate the number of risk 
and forward-looking statements in annual report narratives in Qatar. We also use the two ways clustered error 
pooled panel regression method to examine the determinants of disclosures of these statements. The panel 
regression method removes the combined firm-year effects on the dependent variable producing more precise 
results.   
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The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. 
Research design and method are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
A number of studies have examined the determinants of risk disclosure. In a cross-country study, 
Elshandidy et al (2015) find that systematic risk, the legal system and the cultural values affect the variations 
in risk disclosure levels. Elshandidy and Neri (2015) find that corporate governance affect companies’ 
decision to disclosure risk information in annual reports. They considered a number of governance variables 
such as board size, non-executive directors; independent non-executive directors; CEO duality and 
concentrated ownership. Barakat and Hussainey (2013) find that board independence, ownership type and 
active audit committee members are the key drivers of risk disclosure. Al-Hadi et al (2016) find that the 
existence of ruling family board members negatively affects levels of risk information, especially during 
financial distress and when their levels of risk are high. Using a single country data, Elshandidy et al (2013) 
find that systematic risk, financing risk, risk-adjusted returns, firm size, dividend yield, the proportion of non-
executive directors, insider ownership and effective audit environment affect levels of risk disclosure. Al-
Maghzom, et al., (2016) find that the external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender and board size 
influence levels of risk disclosure. Allini et al (2016) find that the presence of women on the board, the age of 
the board members and the board expertise are the main determinants of risk disclosure. There is, however, 
very little research reported on the impact of governance on risk disclosure in the developing countries. Our 
paper fills this gap.  
A number of studies have examined the determinants of forward-looking disclosure. For example, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that the corporate governance affects earnings forecasts voluntary 
disclosure. Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) find that firm size, profitability, board independence and insider 
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ownership are the main determinants of forward-looking disclosure. Aljifri et al (2013) find that institutional 
and governmental ownership are the main drivers of forward-looking disclosure. Wang and Hussainey (2013) 
find that directors’ ownership, board size, board composition, and CEO duality are the main factors that drive 
UK managers to voluntarily disclose forward-looking information. Athanasakou and Hussainey (2004) find 
that firm-specific characteristics such as levels of forward looking disclosure last year, growth rate, book-
market ratio, number of analysts following the company; firm size, leverage and profitability affect levels of 
forward-looking disclosure. There is, however, very little research reported on the impact of corporate 
governance on forward-looking disclosure in the developing countries. Our paper fills this gap.  
Our paper differs from the above-mentioned literature in a number of ways. We examine the impact of 
governance on both risk and forward-looking disclosure Qatar. We use a comprehensive set of governance 
variables. Methodologically, we use Nvivo 11 software to measure risk and forward-looking disclosure scores. 
We apply the two ways clustered error pooled regression model to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and disclosures.  The two ways clustered error pooled regression model control for any 
measurement error or misspecification. Our method removes the combined firm-year effects on the dependent 
variable and reduces the bias in standard errors. This methodology offers us a better understanding for the 
association between governance and voluntary risk and forward-looking statements. Furthermore, our study 
focuses on the Qatari market, which is different from previous studies’ samples with respect to the size and the 
ownership concentration, restrictions on foreign ownership, recent corporate governance code, and the GDP 
per capita. These differences make us believe that the relationship between corporate governance and 
disclosures in Qatar might be different compared with the findings of developing countries.  
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Agency theory is frequently used in prior research to develop the hypothesised relation between 
governance and voluntary disclosure. The role of voluntary disclosure is crucial in stock markets in general 
and in the stock markets of the developing countries in particular.  As mentioned in Healy and Palepu (2001) 
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lack of disclosure impedes the efficient allocation of resources in a capital market economy. In the context of 
agency theory, conflicts of interests and agency costs are expected to arise when there is incomplete and 
asymmetric information problem between principal and agent in a company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One 
mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry and agency costs problems is to encourage companies to 
increase their levels of relevant information to investors. Another mechanism to reduce these problems is the 
existence of a good corporate governance system. Prior research shows that high-levels of voluntary disclosure 
and good corporate governance system are complementary mechanisms to mitigate agency problems and 
reduce information asymmetry (Baek et al., 2009; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). In the present study, we use 
agency theory in the development of our research hypotheses.  
2.2.1 Foreign Ownership 
  El-Gazzar, (1998) argues that firms with a foreign ownership are probably disclosing more voluntary 
information. This argument has been supported by the empirical work of Xiao, et al., (2004) who find a positive 
association between foreign ownership and earnings forecasts in the Chinese firms. In the same line Ferguson et 
al. (2002) find out that foreign ownership has significant positive effects on voluntary disclosure.  Foreign 
shareholders may suffer from high level of information asymmetry caused by language and law constraints and 
lack of information availability. Based on the agency theory, one possible way to reduce the level of 
information asymmetry is to increase levels of voluntary disclosure. Empirically, Mangena and Tauringana 
(2007) and Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) find a relation between foreign investors and disclosure in developing 
countries. We, therefore, expect that policy-makers in Qatar will be keen to improve the liquidity of the stock 
market through foreign ownership.  Consequently, Qatari companies with high level of foreign ownership are 
most likely to disclose more risk and forward-looking disclosure to reduce the information asymmetry. 
Consequently, we hypothesise that: 
H1.1: A positive association exists between foreign ownership and risk disclosure. 
H1.2: A positive association exists between foreign ownership and forward-looking disclosure. 
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2.2.2 Board Size 
There is a controversial debate in the literature about the impact of board size on disclosure.  On one 
hand, theoretical papers suggest that boards with a small number of directors might be more effective at 
monitoring firms’ managers and hence companies with a small board size might disclose more information 
voluntarily (Herman, 1981; Goodstein et al., 1994 and Yermack, 1996). However, the workload of an 
individual member might be too high and this might negatively affect their ability to effectively monitor firms’ 
managers. On the other hand, large boards are more likely to have a more diversified range of expertise than 
smaller boards and this might increase the effectiveness of the monitoring power of the board and then we 
expect that firms with a large number of boards will disclose more voluntary disclosure. Empirically, prior 
research reports a positive relationship between board size and risk disclosure (see, for example, Elshandidy et 
al, 2013; Elshandidy and Nero, 2015; Al-Maghzom, et al., 2016) and also between board size and forward-
looking disclosure (see, for example, Wang and Hussainey, 2013).  
We, therefore, treat the impact of board size on risk and forward-looking disclosures as a purely 
empirical research question in the Qatari context and we hypothesise that:  
H2.1: Board size has a positive association with risk disclosure.  
H2.2: Board size has a positive association with forward-looking disclosure.  
 
 
2.2.3 Board Composition 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2007 among others suggest that increasing the ratio of non-executive board 
members reduces information asymmetry and leads to an increase in the levels of corporate disclosure. 
However, the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure vary with the data used in 
different countries (for example; Eng and Mak, 2003; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; Boesso 
and Kumar, 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009). Based on the agency theory, non-executive directors can play a vital 
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role in monitoring managers’ performance and motivate managers to disclose more forward-looking 
information (Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Samaha, et al (2015) use a meta-analysis a sample of 64 empirical 
studies and find that board composition has a significant positive effect on voluntary disclosure. Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar (2011) and Wang and Hussainey (2013) find that board independence affect levels of forward-
looking disclosure while Elshandidy et al (2013) find that board independence affect levels of risk disclosure. 
We, therefore, hypothesise that: 
H3.1: There is a positive association between proportion of non-executive and risk disclosure 
H3.2: There is a positive association between proportion of non-executive and forward-looking 
disclosure. 
2.2.4 Role Duality 
Role duality exists when the CEO is also acting as the chair of the board of directors. This situation 
may create advantages and disadvantages. On the disadvantages side, Wang and Hussainey (2013) argue that 
the role duality may reduce the effective control, enable the CEO to engage in opportunistic behavior. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between role duality and voluntary disclosure of risk and 
forward-looking disclosure.  Brickley et al. (1997), however, suggest three benefits for the role duality: quick 
actions, more relevant and timely decisions, strong leadership style.  We believe that these benefits may 
enhance the managerial efficiency but not necessarily lead to higher levels of risk and forward-looking 
disclosures. Literature on the impact of CEO duality on disclosure is mixed. For example, Elshandidy et al 
(2013) find that CEO duality does not affect level of risk information, while Hussainey and Wang (2013) find 
that CEO duality affect levels of forward-looking disclosure. Disclosure literature, in general, shows that the 
role duality is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure (see for example Lakhal (2005) and Samaha et 
al (2015)). We, therefore, hypotheses that:  
H4.1 CEO duality is negatively associated with risk disclosure.  
H4.2 CEO duality is negatively associated with forward-looking disclosure.  
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2.2.5 Control variables 
Following relevant literature we control for firm size (Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2011; Wang and 
Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al, 2013; Althanasakou and Hussainey, 2014; Elshandidy and Nero, 2015; 
Allini et al, 2016; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016); firm growth rate (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; 
Elshandidy et al, 2013; Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014 and Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016) leverage 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Athanasakou and Hussainey, 
2014; Elshandidy, et al, 2015; Elshandidy and Nero, 2015; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016); dividend 
(Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al 2013;  Elshandidy and Neri 
(2015); profitability (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; Elshandidy et al 2013; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; 
Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014; Allini, et al., 2016; Elshandidy and Shrives, 2016).   
3. Research design and methods 
3.3 Regression models 
Following Peterson (2009), we apply two ways clustered error pooled regression model to control for any 
measurement error or misspecification that may naturally “induce” spurious group-level shocks and correlation 
in errors. If the residuals are correlated across firms the OLS standard errors (SE) can be biased, which might 
lead to an incorrect inference of the estimated coefficients (Hoechle 2007 and Petersen 2009). We include firm 
and year dummies to consider for measurement errors, and the effect of heterogeneity in the sample, as well as 
to control for omitted variable bias in the model. We use the following regression models: 
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DS represents our disclosure measure risk information (R) and forward-looking information (F). The 
intercepts are α and β in model 1 and 2 respectively.  FDUMY is a dummy variable (used only in model 1) 
defined to be one for firms belong to banking or insurance sectors and zero otherwise. Model 2 examines the 
industry effect using a set of 7 dummy variables (IND) which takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the industry 
and take the value 0 otherwise. As Qatar exchanges has eight sectors, we consider 7 dummy variables and we 
use the Telecom sector as a reference sector.  FO is the ratio of foreign ownership in the each firm.  BS (board 
size) is the log of the total number of directors on the board. BC (board composition) is the percentage of non-
executive directors, that is, the number of non-executive directors divided by the board size. Duality is a 
dummy variable for role duality (1 for duality and zero for separation). DY (dividend) is the dividend yield. FS 
(firm size) is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization. ROE (profitability) is the return on Equity; 1 
and LEV is the leverage ratio (total debt / total assets); MB is market to book ratio; and FC is a dummy 
variable for the last financial crisis (1 if the observation in years 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise). Table 1 
provides the description for our variables. 
Table 1 about here 
  In the above models, the (FO) captures the ownership structure while three explanatory variables (BS, 
BC, and Duality) capture the board characteristics. FO shows the ownership concentration for foreign investors 
who are expected to be effective external monitors of managerial discretion in financial reporting, as they are 
mainly institutions. If our first hypothesis holds, the coefficients 2 and 2  should be positive. The BS is the 
total number of directors on the board. The larger the board the more likely that the board encourages greater 
disclosure of future-oriented information in the annual reports. Therefore, we expect the coefficients 3 and 3  
to be positive. The BC measures the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. Cadbury (1992), among 
others, report that the non-executive directors can effectively enhance the transparency of the firm which leads 
us to expect the disclosure score to be positively associated with BC and, therefore, we expect 
                                            
1 The ROE is a traditional variable used in the research as a proxy for profitability. Following Eng and Mak (2003) we use also ROA 
as a robustness test and find consistent results. Results are available upon request. 
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coefficients 4 and 4  to be positive. Duality measures whether the chairperson also has the role of corporate 
CEO or not. Under duality, the firm’s management has greater power over the board’s decision-making process; 
and, hence, the firm might be less likely to voluntarily disclose a large amount of forward-looking information 
in its annual reports. Therefore, we expect the coefficients 5 and 5  to be negative. Other control variables are 
proxies for the remaining firm characteristics. 
3.1 Data 
Our dataset includes all firms (43 firms) listed on the Qatar Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2014. Our 
motivations to choose this period are as follows. First, it is the time after the last financial crisis. Second this 
period allowed to us to study the impact of new governance code in Qatar (2009) on risk and forward-looking 
disclosure. Finally, we have to admit that it is not easy to find complete annual reports for all listed firms in 
Qatar before 2008.  Although Qatar Exchange (previously known as Doha Securities Market) started in 1997, 
the trade volume and number of listed firms increased dramatically after 2003 and most of the listed firms 
have its full annual reports from 2008. 
Unlike the previous research, we include financial firms in our analysis because the financial sector is 
the biggest sector in Qatar Exchange (34.32% from the 42 listed firms). Therefore, we separate our sample to 
two sub samples considering both non-financial and financial firms. We downloaded the annual reports for the 
sample firms from the Qatar Exchange web site, gulf base and Bloomberg databases. We convert these reports 
into text format. We use NVivo 11 software to calculate the number of risk and forward-looking statements. 
QSR NVivo software has recently been used widely in the literature to measure levels of risk disclosure (e.g. 
Elshandidy et al, 2013; Elshandidy et al, 2015) and forward-looking disclosure (e.g. Wang and Hussainey, 
2013; Athanasakou, and Hussainey, 2014; Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015 & Hassanien et al, 2018). We apply 
some filtering procedures according to the data availability. Firms that do not have full annual reports for the 
study period from 2008 to 2014 are excluded from our sample. Therefore, our final sample is 35 listed 
companies (245 firm-year observations).  
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3.2 Measuring the levels of risk and forward-looking statements   
Our dependent variables are risk and forward- looking disclosures. We follow recent disclosure studies 
to measure the risk disclosure. Elshandidy et al (2013; 2015) measure risk disclosure in three steps. First, they 
use prior academic and professional research on risk concepts. They also use Roget's Thesaurus dictionary and 
annual reports to identify a comprehensive list of key words. Second, they check for the ability of these words 
to capture the risk statements. They eliminated all keywords that do not capture risk information in their pilot 
study of a small sample of annual reports. Finally, they check for the reliability and validity of their final list 
of risk words. They use the following keywords for measuring total risk disclosure: risk*, loss*, decline 
(declined), decrease (decreased), less, low*, fail (failure), threat, verse (versed; reverse; reversed), viable, 
against, catastrophe (catastrophic), shortage, unable, challenge (challenges), uncertain (uncertainty; 
uncertainties), gain (gains), chance (chances), increase (increased), peak (peaked), fluctuate*, differ*, 
diversify*, probable* and significant*.Words denoted by * also include derivatives of the original. To capture 
the mandatory risk disclosure, they use the following keywords: derivatives, financial instruments, 
investments, segments and foreign currency. Differences between total risk disclosure score and mandatory 
disclosure score represent the level of voluntary risk disclosure. We use the Nvivo 11 software, developed by 
QSR International, to identify the number of sentences that contain at least one risk keyword.  
   Following Wang and Hussainey (2013), we use the computer-based content analysis procedure 
developed by Hussainey et al. (2003) to identify the number of forward-looking statements. These keywords 
are: accelerate, anticipate, await, coming (financial) year(s), coming months, confidence (or confident), 
convince, (current) financial year, envisage, estimate, eventual, expect, forecast, forthcoming, hope, intend (or 
intention), likely (or unlikely), look forward (or look ahead), next, novel, optimistic, outlook, planned (or 
planning), predict, prospect, remain, renew, scope for (or scope to), shall, shortly, should, soon, will, well 
placed (or well positioned), and year(s) ahead. Like Hussainey et al. (2003) we take the future year numbers 
into account in the list of keywords for the forward-looking content related to earnings forecasts.  
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A disclosure score has been generated for the sample through two steps. In the first step, we examine 
the narrative sections of the annual reports for forward-looking information, because these sections are more 
likely to contain this type of information. Next, we use the Nvivo version 11 software to identify the number 
of sentences that contain at least one forward-looking keyword. 
4.  Empirical analysis  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. The highest forward-looking disclosure score is 170 
statements while the lowest is two statements. This indicates that significant variation in disclosure practice 
exists between Qatari firms. Similarly, the highest risk disclosure score of the sampled firms is 189 statements 
while the lowest is one statement. 
The average firm has 47.7% of total debt of total assets. The median of leverage is 45.9 percent with a 
standard deviation 26.12. This indicates that our sample consists of reasonably geared firms with a little 
variation in the financial leverage. The mean of the market to book ratio is 1.99 suggesting that our sample 
includes well-preformed firms with a moderate dispersion exists among observations with regard to their market 
to book ratio. Furthermore, the average return on equity is 5.3% with a maximum of 57.87% and a minimum of 
-25.07% and the standard deviation is about 1.61. These results show that firms in our sample are fairly 
performing well during the period of our analysis on average. Finally, on average, firms pay dividends of 4% 
with relatively low dispersion 2.8.  
The mean non-executive directors on board ratio is 0.43 and the highest value of .88. The mean market 
capitalization of the firms in the sample is 28 billion Qatari Riyal with a maximum of 486 billion and only a 
minimum of 283 million. The average return on assets is 6.7 with a maximum of 29.96% and a minimum of –
6.22 this indicating that the firms are well performed in terms of profitability measured by return on assets. A 
few extremely large firms skew market capitalization and its mean is much higher than the median. Therefore, 
we use the natural logarithm of the market capitalization to reduce this skewness. Similarly, we measure the 
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variable BS as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors.  Shapiro and Wilk’s (1965) test has been 
applied and shows that our variables are normally distributed.  
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation. The correlation between forward-looking disclosure and risk 
disclosure is 47% significant at the 1% level. Only the correlation coefficient between risk disclosure (R) and 
firm size (FS) is relatively high. Risk disclosure is also correlated with dividend yield, leverage and market-to-
book ratio. The correlation between the independent variables is less than 0.70, suggesting that there is no 
multicollinearity problem. Our measure for the disclosure of forward-looking statements is not correlated 
statistically with all of the corporate governance except foreign ownership (FO). The disclosure of forward-
looking statements is statistically correlated with all of the firm characteristics variables except for market to 
book ratio (MB) and the return on equity (ROE). 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 reports the two ways clustered error pooled regression models (1) and (2).  Columns 2 and 3 
show the findings of model (1), while Columns 4 and 5 show the findings of model (2).  
The third and fifth columns of table 4 present the findings of model (1) and (2) related to the 
determinants of risk disclosure. We did not find any significant relationships between risk disclosure and any 
governance variables (i.e. foreign ownership; board size; board composition; CEO duality role) and therefore 
we reject hypotheses 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1 respectively. These findings suggest that the quality of corporate 
governance system does not affect the companies’ decision to report risk information in their annual reports.  
Looking at our control variables, we find that market to book ratio, firm size and profitability affect the 
levels of risk disclosure. The results indicate that large firms with a high market to book (higher growth 
opportunity firms) and high levered firms is motivated to disclose more about their risks compared to other 
firms. We did not find an industry effect on the risk disclosure of Qatari firms, this is not in line with Khlif and 
Hussainey (2016) who find that relation between profitability and risk disclosure is affected by industry type. 
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Our findings suggest that some firm-specific characteristics (not corporate governance) affect the level of risk 
disclosure in the Qatari context.   
The second and fourth columns of table 4 present the findings of model (1) and (2) related to the 
determinants of forward-looking disclosure. The second column shows that board size, foreign ownership, 
profitability, firm size, and leverage affect the levels of forward looking disclosure. The coefficient of the 
foreign ownership is positive and significant at the 1% level. Therefore, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.2. 
Foreign investors, who typically hold around 28% of the shares in Qatari firms, is positively associated with the 
level of forward-looking disclosure. This suggests that firms owned by international investors are more 
motivated to enhance the quantity of the voluntary disclosure related to the future to maintain their international 
shareholders as they have more probability to move away if they do not have enough information about the 
future prospects of the company.  
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 show that there is a negative association between forward-looking 
statements and board size. This finding suggests that the smaller number of directors in the board the higher the 
level of voluntary disclosure related to the future. Therefore, the finding supports Hypothesis 2.2. This result is 
consistent with a trend in the literature that argues that boards with a small number of directors might be more 
effective in monitoring firms’ managers. Hence, companies with small board size are expected to disclose more 
forward looking /risk information (Herman, 1981; Goodstein et al., 1994 and Yermack (1996). 
We did not find any significant relationship between forward-looking disclosure and either the 
percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board or CEO role duality. Therefore, we reject hypotheses 
3.2 and 4.2. These findings suggest that non-executive directors in the Qatari firms may not have the adequate 
expertise and knowledge to effectively influence the forward-looking disclosure practice to the best interest of 
their companies. In addition, the findings suggest that the division of responsibilities between the role of the 
Chairman and CEO is clear in Qatari companies and no one person has unfettered power to take decisions.  
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The controlled firms’ characteristics, that is, firm size, profitability, and leverage ratio are significant, 
suggesting that large, profitable and highly geared firms disclose more forward-looking disclosure. We did not 
find an association between dividend yield and market to book ratios and the level of forward-looking 
disclosure, suggesting that Qatari companies do not use dividend as a substitute for forward-looking disclosure 
to signal their good performance. The findings also suggest that the status of corporate growth (high or low 
growth) does not also the affect level of forward-looking disclosure.  
Finally, we find a negative association between forward-looking disclosure and the financial sector 
dummy variable. These results may suggest that financial firms tend to disclose less information about their 
future compared to non-financial firms to avoid any potential litigation costs.  
Overall, it seems that Qatari companies try to attract foreign investors by disclosing more forward-
looking information and the board of directors support this disclosure practice. However, these companies have 
the fear of the negative consequences of reporting risk related information in their annual reports (i.e. low share 
price; lower firm value; higher cost of capital).  
Table 4 about here 
Financial Vs Nonfinancial firms 
This section investigates if the motivations for both forward-looking and risk disclosure are different between 
financial and nonfinancial Qatari firms. Table 5 panel A presents the results of model 1 using the data of 
financial firms (126 firm/year observations). The results of regressing the forward-looking disclosure on 
corporate governance variables and firm characteristics are very similar to our previous results of the whole 
sample. The board size, foreign ownership, firm size, and financial leverage can explain the variation in 
forward-looking disclosure. We have got some new findings here. Profitability is now insignificant. These 
results are consistent with Hossain and Hammami, (2009) who explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports of 25 listed firms of Doha Securities Market.  Hossain and Hammami, (2009) report that 
profitability cannot explain voluntary disclosure where the board size does. In addition, financial crisis variable 
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is now significant (and still negative), suggesting that Qatari companies disclose less forward-looking 
information after the global financial crisis. The results reported in the second columns in Table 5 Panel A did 
not show any significant relationships between risk disclosure and either foreign ownership, or board size. We, 
however, find a negative relationship between risk disclosure and both the number of non-executive directors 
and CEO duality. Finally, Table 5 Panel A shows that risk disclosure can be explained by leverage, firm size, 
and profitability.  
The results of nonfinancial firms in panel B of table 5 are less significant compared to the financial firms. We 
have found only a significant relationship between foreign ownership and forward-looking disclosure. This 
support our previous findings that firms with high level of foreign ownership disclose more about their future. 
The puzzle is that we find a negative association between the firm size and forward looking disclosure that is 
contradicting with our expectation. It suggests that small non-financial firms tend to show more about its 
financial plans to attract investors.  Furthermore, Table 5 shows that the risk disclosure scores increase in non-
financial profitable, levered, and value firms (low market to book ratio) compared to other non-financial firms.   
Table 5 about here 
5. Conclusion  
We used the computerised content analysis to analyse the annual report of a sample of Qatari listed 
companies from 2008 to 2014. We then used the two ways clustered error pooled panel regressions to find 
which governance mechanism affect risk and forward-looking disclosures. We found that the foreign ownership 
has a positive effect on forward-looking disclosure, while board size has a negative impact. We also found that 
financial firms tend to disclose less information about their future plans compared to nonfinancial firms, 
however, they tend to disclose more information about their future plans after the last financial crisis. In 
addition, we found significant negative relationships between the risk disclosure index and both the number of 
non-executive members in the board of directors and CEO.   
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Our findings have practical implications. It shows that the effectiveness of corporate governance code 
in promoting transparency in Qatar. Qatar Governance Code has been issued in 2009, the path to effective 
corporate governance practice still needs to be investigated. Our results suggested that Qatari policy-makers 
and regulators need to consider the importance of foreign ownership, duality, board size, and board 
composition to increase the quality of voluntary disclosure for risk and looking-forward information. Our 
findings also might encourage investors to invest in firms with higher foreign ownership ratio, non-executive 
members ratio, and no duality with a small number of board directors if they are looking for more transparent 
companies (i.e. more risk and forward-looking disclosures). Because of the economic growth in Qatar is 
rapidly increasing, our findings suggest that hard work is needed to improve the quality of corporate reporting 
as well as the quality of governance as a part of the Qatari new strategic plan 2030.   
Our study has two main limitations. First the limited availability of Qatari firms corporate governance data 
before 2012 which lead us to remove some firms from our analysis and to end with a small number of 
observations. The second limitation is that we study the determinants of disclosure (the supply side of the 
financial communication), but we ignore the demand side of the financial communication (i.e. the impact of 
disclosure on stakeholders).    
We offer avenues for further research. Future research may explore the value relevance and the economic 
consequences of risk and forward-looking disclosures in the Qatari annual reports. Second cross-country” 
studies can be undertaken to examine the economic consequences of risk disclosure for a sample of Middle 
Eastern countries. Furthermore, how board’s role may affect risk disclosure within specific industry sectors 
merit further attention.  
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Table: 1: Variables Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Proxy 
DS (R; F) DS is the disclosure score.  R is the number of risk statements, while  F is the number of forward-looking 
statements, 
Independent Variables 
FO  The ratio of foreign ownership. 
BS Number of all directors in the board of directors.  
Duality Dummy variable (1 for duality and zero for separation). 
BC  Board composition (the number of non-executive directors divided by the board size). 
Control Variables 
DY   Dividend yield 
FS  Firm size (the natural logarithm of the market capitalization)  
ROE Profitability (The return on Equity). 
LEV  The leverage ratio (total debt / total assets) 
MB Market to book ratio 
FC Dummy variable for the last financial crisis (1 if the observation in years 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise)  
FDUMY  Dummy variable (1 if  a firm is belong to banking or insurance sectors and 0 otherwise) 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistic 
Variables Mean. S.D Min. Median. Max. Obs. 
F 46.56 35.59 2 36 170 245 
BC 0.43 0.38 0 0.36 0.88 245 
BS 8.33 1.58 5 8 11 245 
DUL 0.40 0.78 0 0 10 245 
FDUM 0.51 0.50 0 1 1 245 
DY 4.42 2.85 0 4.38 12.14 245 
FO 0.28 0.19 0.08 0.25 1 245 
FS2 28965847 61886892 283025 7237146 486000000 245 
LEV 47.71 26.12 0.07 45.94 100.00 245 
MB 1.99 1.24 0.48 1.75 13 245 
R 42.33 43.82 1 25 189 245 
ROA% 6.72 5.82 -6.22 5.08 29.96 245 
ROE% 5.35 1.61 -25.07 14.75 57.87 245 
FC 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 245 
See Table 1 for the variable definitions
                                            
2 Numbers in thousand Qatari Riyal ( 1$=3.65 QR) 
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlations 
Probability F  BC  BS  DUL  FDUM  DY  FO  FS  LEV  MB  R ROA 
RO
E  
F 1             
BC  0.01 1 
           
BS  -0.07 0.05 1 
          
DUL 0.02 0.05 -0.03 1 
         
FDUM  -0.08 -0.08 0.22*** 0.03 1 
        
DY  0.01 -0.09 0.33*** 0.10 0.23*** 1 
       
FO  0.29*** -0.01 0.27*** -0.01 0.02 0.07 1 
      
FS  0.29*** 0.02 0.16** 0.15** 0.47*** 0.19*** 0.01 1 
     
LEV 0.31*** 0.15** 0.14** -0.13** 0.19*** 0.14** 0.06 0.10 1 
    
MB  -0.01 0.11* -0.12* -0.01 -0.28*** -0.12** -0.18*** 0.01 0.12** 1 
   
R  0.47*** -0.07 0.10 0.08 0.38*** 0.12** 0.10 0.46*** 0.34*** -0.13** 1 
  
ROA  -0.23*** -0.10 -0.13** 0.14** -0.37*** 0.05 -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.40*** 0.26*** -0.39*** 1 
 
ROE -0.01 -0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.11* 0.01 0.03 -0.11* -0.03 0.05 0.1 1 
FC  -0.11* 0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -2.80E-17 0.15** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.1 
See Table 1 for the variable definitions.  
*** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Two Ways Cluster Errors Regression 
 
  
Future disclosure Risk disclosure 
Future disclosure 
industry effect 
Risk disclosure 
Industry effect 
FDUM  -0.67** 0.26   
FO  1.54*** 0.44 0.62 0.91 
BS  -1.00*** -0.33 -0.57*** -0.53 
BC  -0.11 -0.32 -0.13 -0.38 
DUL 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.14 
FC  -0.21 -0.10 -0.21 -0.10 
MB  -0.08 0.13** -0.02 -0.07 
DY  0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
ROE 0.02* 0.04*** 0.03* 0.06*** 
FS  0.06*** 0.07** 0.06** 0.11*** 
LEV 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
BANKS   -1.37** -0.08 
GOODS   -0.99*** -0.63 
INDUSTRIAL   -1.27*** -0.44 
INSURANCE   -1.82*** 0.46 
REALSTATE   -0.30 0.74* 
TELEC   Reference sector Reference sector 
TRANSPORT   -0.41 0.60 
Intercept 4.87*** 2.87** 4.81*** 2.92** 
R-squared 0.40 0.36 0.51 0.43 
F test  30.44*** 47.34*** 40.89*** 38.05*** 
See Table 1 for the variable definitions 
*** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% level of significance.  
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Table 5: Financial Vs Nonfinancial Firms 
 Panel A: Financial Firms Panel B: Nonfinancial Firms 
 
  
Future disclosure Risk disclosure Future disclosure  
Risk disclosure 
 
FO  1.48*** -0.11 1.44*** 0.12 
BC  -0.11 -0.82** -0.05 -0.16 
DUL 0.14 0.91*** 0.04 -0.26 
FC  -0.25** -0.17 -0.13 0.04 
MB  -0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.16*** 
DY  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 
ROE 0.85 3.71* 0.01 0.46*** 
FS  0.10*** 0.09*** -0.03** 0.02 
LEV 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01* 
Intercept 3.53*** 3.65** 3.59*** 1.13 
R-squared 0.68 0.56 0.29 0.19 
F test  34.99*** 15.79*** 24.42*** 8.18*** 
See Table 1 for the variable definitions 
Note: *** denotes 1%, ** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% level of 
significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
